



No. L.326.OP/SPL DRIVE/33

Date: 23.04.2025

Sr. DEE /TRO/BB, BSL, NGP
 Sr. DME/Fr& Op/ BB
 Sr. DME/Op/ PA
 DME (O&C) SUR

CEE (OP) Instruction No. 04/2025**Sub:** Special Safety Drive for Prevention of SPAD.**Ref:** Railway Board's letter no. 2025/Elect (TRS)/138/1(Bd. Mtg) dated 21.04.2025 & 22.04.2025.

Recently there have been several SPAD incidents in other Zonal Railways. Brief details are as below:

Case-1: SPAD of 18257 at Anuppur Yard in Bilaspur Division (SECR) :

Sr. No.	Items	Details
1	Date of Incident	18.03.2025
2	Location	Anuppur Yard in Bilaspur Division (SECR)
3	Incident	Train arrived APR on line No. 3 at 03:12 hrs. Loco reversed at 04:05 hrs. Train ready at 04:10 hrs. LP overshoot Starter Signal (S-32) of APR yard at ON as he misinterpreted starter signal of line No. 2 as his own.
4	Crew Mistake	Crew mistook the signal of the adjacent line as their own signal.

Case-2: SPAD of Train No. 22177 between Dabhaura (DBR) and KataiyaDandi (KTDD) stations in PRYJ Division (NCR) :

Sr. No.	Items	Details
1	Date of Incident	01.04.2025
2	Location	IBH signal no. 08 between DBR-KTDD at km no. 1283/20-22
3	Incident	Train no. 22177 Mahanagari Express passed DBR at 21:06 hrs and passed IBH signal no. 08 between DBR-KTDD at km no. 1283/20-22, at danger.
4	Crew Mistake	1. Loco pilot passed the distant signal at a speed of 59 kmph and further reduced the speed to 40 kmph. 2. Later on the speed increased to 46 kmph due to falling gradient of 1:250 and throttle was in traction side after initial braking. 3. Misjudgment in braking distance and delayed application of emergency brakes by LP/ALP. 4. ALP did not observed LPs action for reducing speed and stopping the train. 5. Mobile phone of LP was in switched ON condition.

Case-3: SPAD of Train No. 68706(DGG-BSP MEMU) passed Home signal S-2 at Parmalkasa station In Nagpur division (SECR) :

Sr. No.	Items	Details
1	Date of Incident	06.04.2025
2	Location	Home signal S-2 at Parmalkasa station.
3	Incident	Train no 68706 left RJN at 12:18hrs. In PMS station yard, there was a S&T block on point no 32 A & B from 12:15 hrs to 12:25 hrs. It was planned by on duty DY.SS to admit the train on line no 3 i.e DN main line. But before Cancellation of S&T block, Train no 68706 passed the Home signal S-2 at 12:23 hrs in Danger aspect.
4	Crew Mistake	1. Loco Pilot passed Automatic signal No. 342 at One Yellow aspect at the speed of 83 kmph and further speed was reduced to 70 kmph. 2. Loco Pilot failed to control the train after passing One Yellow aspect of previous signal. 3. ALP did not observe LPs action for reducing speed and stopping the train and failed to apply Emergency brakes. 4. Mobile phone of LP was in switched ON condition.

To avoid such cases, there is a need to further sensitize the loco running staff through regular counseling/monitoring on following items:

1. Duties of LP & ALP in respect of signal as per G&SR 3.78 must be followed rigorously.
2. Ambush checks of running staff by Loco inspectors to check calling out of signals loudly with hand gesture by LP and ALP.
3. Whether the ALP is holding the RS valve after passing signal at Yellow and observing Loco Pilot's action for stopping the train at Red signal.
4. Specific monitoring of crew regarding train control on yellow signal and train control on gradients so as to stop promptly at RED signal; control of trains in Automatic block System.
5. Loco Pilot is reducing the speed proportionately in case signal aspect is restrictive and not presuming the aspect of next signal.
6. Crew should be more alert on critical signals i.e. signals located on RHS, ELHS & on curvatures etc.
7. Divisions should ensure Psycho test passed LPs are booked to work on EMU/ MEMU trains.
8. Mobile phone must be in switched OFF condition. Ambush checks to be carried to ensure mobile phones are switched OFF during train operation.
9. Motorman is switching on the Audio-Visual Buzzer, after passing yellow signal. Surprise ambush checks to be carried to ensure that motorman are switching ON Audio Visual System, while passing Yellow signal.
10. AWS should not be kept in isolated condition.

11. Counsel the crew that in the extreme case due to any reason, if crew fails to locate any signal due to any obstruction, he should stop his train and then proceed cautiously up to next signal and ensure the signal aspect and work further.
12. Adequate rest at Running room and Headquarter should be ensured.
13. Analysis of SPM/CVWRS data to check that crew is conducting Brake feel test & Brake power test at first opportunity and to detect micro-sleep, calling out of signal with hand gesture and ALP is keeping hand on RS flap valve after passing yellow signal.
14. Signal Location booklet should be available and should be kept in open condition on desk by ALP.

In view of the above, 15 days Special safety drive for prevention of SPAD commencing from 24.04.2025 to be launched and loco running staff to be counseled intensively, focusing on aspects mentioned in above for Safe Train Operation.

Report of the drive to be submitted in the following format to this office.

- I. No. of inspections carried out by Officers/CLIs with locations/ yards.
- II. No. of night inspections carried out.
- III. No. of irregularities noticed during inspections.
- IV. Action taken for rectifying irregularities.
- V. No of staff counselled (cadre wise).

 23.04.2025
(H. M. SHARMA)
CEE (OP)